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DIVERSION FROM THE CRIMINAL PROCESS:

INFORMAL DISCRETION, MOTIVATION, AND
FORMALIZATION
By SAMUEL J. BRAKEL*
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE concept and practice of diversion is neither novel nor
esoteric. Indeed, the exercise of some forms of discretion
by criminal justice officials- ranging from the initial decision
not to arrest, to the determination to refrain from prosecution,
and up through the acquittal of the "guilty"-has always been
an integral part of the criminal process. However, recognition
and articulation of this phenomenon as part of a conceptually
distinct and analytically helpful process called diversion is much
more recent. Only in the past few years has the term diversion
become common usage not only in academic circles, but even
among officials in the criminal justice system who, having
*Research

Attorney, American Bar Foundation; A.B. 1965, Davidson

College; J.D. 1968, University of Chicago Law School.
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transcended the usual cultural-linguistic lag, are beginning to
see it as part of their vocabulary.
The new familiarity of the term and concept of diversion
is hardly attributable to the abundance of literature on the subject, since the literature dealing specifically with this notion is
quite scarce.' The concept of diversion has been touched upon3
or police
in incidental fashion in treatments of prosecutorial'
discretion, or in the context of arguments in favor of decriminalization, 4 with diversion usually viewed as a means of cushioning the impact of harsh laws but generally submerged in the
viewer's preoccupation with more conspicuous or better-known
Consedispositional processes- trial and plea-bargaining.
characterquently, although diversion has been identified as a
little writing exisis on the topic of non-criminal processing argues
for the need for further exploration and a clearer focus. The literary
experience also indicates that the present commonness of the term
"diversion" stems not from the literature but more likely from the recent persistent habits of a growing number of academicians and reformers who circulate among criminal justice officials and periodically
confront and bewilder them with questions and proposals on the subject. One topical article which focused on diversion in rural areas of
Southern Illinois grew out of an American Bar Foundation study conducted two years ago. This modest piece, which exhibited a somewhat
misleading emphasis on mental hospital practices, concluded that diversion in the informal rural setting came close to being the rule rather
than the exception to "traditional" criminal processing. Brakel & South,
Diversion From the Criminal Process in the Rural Community, 7 AM.
CRIM. L.Q. 122 (1969).
2 See generally R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION:
THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969); and D. NEW-

I What

MAN, CONVICTION:

THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT

TRIAL (1966) (American Bar Foundation's Administration of Criminal
Justice Series). See also Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response,
55 GEO. L.J. 1048 (1967); Freedman. The Professional Responsibility of
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030 (1967) and Kaplan, The
ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965).
3 See generally W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY (1966) (American Bar Foundation's Administration of Criminal Justice Series). J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J.
543 (1969).
4 See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); J.
BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION T0 THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

(Hafner Library of Classics No. 6); P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEH. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1964); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIVIINAL SANCTION (1968);
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,374 ANNALS 157 (1967); Remington, The Limits and Possibilitiesof the Criminal Law. 43 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 865 (1968). Abstract discussions of the problem of "overcriminalizaticn," however, have failed to recognize the practical realities of
existing diversionary practices. As a result, the arguments in favor of
decriminalization have overstressed the recognition of the substantive
impropriety (the harshne-s) of the criminal law. The problem with
these arguments is that their basic premise is only one element in a
series of philcsophies and circumstances which are at the root of proposed or practiced decriminalization by diversion. In short, framing the
argument in favor of diversion in terms of the harshness of the law is
less than compelling when criminal justice officials already divert for
a variety cf other compelling reasons; talk of substantive or procedural
due process is less than apposite when practitioners in the criminal justice system regularly avoid both substance and procedure.
(1948)

MENT OF MORALS (1959);
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istic of official practice in separate analyses of the various
decisionmaking junctures, there has been no significant attempt
to distinguish it from other kinds of discretionary behavior, or
to explore the essence and the range of diversionary practices
and the variety of motivations behind them. But the fact is
that the dispositional process for a substantial (though not precisely known) number of criminal cases covering a wide variety
of offenses bears little relation to traditional conceptualizations
and modes of analysis. The fact that the diversion process is
often informal and unrecorded has contributed to depriving it
of the focal attention it merits.
I.

THE DIVERSION CONCEPT

Though the concept of diversion (or non-criminal disposition) is to some extent self-explanatory, a precise definition
is difficult. The term diversion has been used loosely from
time to time in contexts which imply a lack of agreement as to
whether a certain process or disposition falls within the meaning of the concept. It is not the purpose of this article to participate in a debate over categorization. Rather, the definition
offered here is an operational one which may help clarify the
conceptual focus and hence the discussion of the issues in the
remainder of this article.
For these purposes, then, diversion is the practice by criminal justice officials - police, prosecutors, and judges - of channeling out of the criminal process classes of offenders who, as a
consequence of their probable and assumed guilt, could theoretically be handled by the criminal process. Diversion contemplates some sort of dispositional response, though it is often
minimalistic and ineffectual, and in some instances a mere "donothing" response. Diversion usually (though not necessarily
or always) means stopping short of conviction, sometimes short
of prosecution or even formal arrest.
Diversion is most commonly a discretionary exercise and it
has been used as synonymous with discretion. But not all
diversion is discretionary. Some diversionary practices are
highly structured, as, for example, diversion circumscribed by
the laws of criminal irresponsibility (insanity pleas). 5 Moreover, diversion is distinct from discretion to the extent that it
is an aspect of discretion, which is a broader notion. Diversion
operates only to channel offenders out of the criminal system,
5 American Bar Foundation studies already dealing with this type of
diversion are: A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1970); and R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENALLY ILL

(1968).
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whereas discretion generally can be used to achieve exactly
opposite ends. For example, criminal justice officials use discretion to invoke the criminal process for offenses and offenders popularly perceived as not warranting criminal handling,
e.g., "victimless" crimes, morals offenses between consenting
parties, drug or liquor "abuse," and so forth.
II. THE SPECIFIC Focus
The object of this article is to describe and analyze the
concept of diversion on the basis of field research conducted
in several urban centers in the Midwest.' The intention is not
to treat in narrow and quantified detail the findings of the Midwest study, since subsequent reports on the American Bar
Foundation project of which this study was a part will serve
that purpose. Rather, this article will present some preliminary
conclusions and impressions about the nature of diversionary
practices, their motivations, and official attempts to formalize
these practices. The data gathered during the course of the
field work suggests that there are serious problems connected
with (perhaps inherent in) the informality which characterizes many diversionary practices. But the experiences with
formalized diversion raise equally troublesome questions. One
certain conclusion is that the issues surrounding diversion are
highly complex and not subject to facile analysis, nor to unidimensional resolutions.
This article will focus on diversionary practices which obtain in the areas of white-collar crimes, shoplifting, family disputes, and first offenses. There are many other areas involving
common diversionary practices, or practices which may be
diversionary, which have been exciuded from the scope of
this article.
These four general areas of crime- white collar offenses,
a profitshoplifting, family disputes, and first offenses -offer
table setting for the problems and issues which must be ex6 The survey was conducted in the fall of 1970 as part of the American
Bar Foundation's project on Non-criminal Disposition of Criminal Cases,
directed by Donald M. McIntyre. The cities are Cleveland, Ohio; Des
Moines, Iowa; Indianapolis, Indiana; Kansas City, Missouri; Milwaukee.
Wisconsin; Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; and St. Louis, Missouri.
The purpose of tl~e Midwestern swing was to arrive at an inventory and
overview of the various diversicnary practices which prevail in the
criminal justice operations of the urban centers of this country. The
Midwestern survey served as a complement to similar work conducted
earlier in the life cf the study in such geographically diverse urban
centers as New York, Philadephia, Baltimore, Chicago, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and Seattle. Toward completion of the urban focus, the
study further contemplates a similar effcrt (and in addition a more
concentrated inquiry into the issues which have emerged) in the middlesized cities of Charlotte, North Carolina and Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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plored. The diversionary practices commonly applied in these
areas are typically informal and inconspicuous. They occur at
various stages in the criminal process, and the dispositions are
generally devoid of approbative aspects except very perfunctory
ones.7 Though not exhaustive of the range of practices encountered during the field work, the areas selected for focus
in this article do coincide with the dominant themes which
developed in the course of interviews with the practicing officials, and it appeared that these "middle-ground" diversionary
practices would sufficiently demonstrate the problems and complexities of diversion in general. This focus seemed to present
an advantage over concentration on the particularly frequent
(plea-bargaining accounts for anywhere from 75 percent to 95
percent of all criminal dispositions s and is rather difficult to fit
within the concept of diversion), the particularily structured
(commitment to mental institutions), or the particularly "undesirable" (police pay-offs, immunity for unreliable informers).
Moreover, formalization schemes have been attempted in each
of the four areas selected, providing a context which suggests
to the fullest the intractability of the problems raised by the
practice of diversion.
The organization and thrust of this article will be the following: First, the four categories of offenses will each be discussed in terms of the rationales for the practice of diversion
in each of those particular situations. The analysis will suggest
that informal diversion carries with it a substantial potential
for discriminatory application. Second, the attempts at formalization of the practices will be examined. The point of this
discussion is to indicate that these attempts have been mis7 In short, the practices dealt with in this article stand in sharp contrast

to such ccnspicuous non-criminal dispositions as may result, for instance,
from a plea of insanity, where the diversion option is formally documented in legal codes or cases, occurs cnly at the last stage of criminal
processing, and includes very real sanctions, the punitive character of
which is only guised by a twist in semantics which serves to make the
deprivation of freedom which does result, "morally" palatable.
Other practices which have at times been labeled diversionary in
conception and implementation but which are excluded from the scope
of this article are the commcn disposition of probation, non-criminal
handling of drug addicts and alcoholics, "morals" offenses, the sweeping
institutionalized (diversionary?) scheme of juvenile justice (except to
the extent that scme aspects of the handling of youthful offenders are
relevant to the diversion concept generally), and other particular practices listed in the text below. The reason for these exclusions is in part
that these practices have been treated extensively, albeit not usually
with the focus preferred in this article, in other writings. But the more
basic reason is that the practices selected for inclusion appear more
likely to raise the crucial issues and problems inherent in diversion than
those excluded.
8 These figures were obtained in the course of the field study. They are
confirmed in writings such as NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
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directed. The formalizers have oversimplified the problems of
diversion, and they appear to have been uncertain in identifying
the purpose behind their attempts. These failings are not surprising because the informality of diversion is both its strength
and its weakness, its necessary essence and its undesirable
aspect, its promise of rationality and its potential for abuse.
Does one structure, check, eliminate, control, legitimize, standardize, promote, or kill such a thing? The real failing of the
formalizers is that they acted, whereas they should have studied.
III.

SPECIFIC PRACTICES AND THEIR RATIONALES

The types of non-criminal dispositions with which we are
concerned occur primarily, if not exclusively, in the area of
misdemeanors. The very fact implies the rationale: the offense
is "not too serious," and to expend the full energies of the
criminal system in prosecuting such offense is simply "not
worth it." 9 This statement comes close to describing the essence
of the reasons behind the diversionary practices in question.
However, by the use of specific offenses or categories of offenses
as examples, it will become clear that the rationale is not as
simple and one-dimensional as it appears; that the characterization of an offense by criminal justice officials as "not too
serious" involves a variety of interrelated considerations; and
that the phrase "not worth it" similarly denotes a complex of
factors. Even at that, the statement risks incompleteness and
oversimplification. Some of the motivations behind diversionary
decisions fit only loosely within this generalization; involved are
such disparate rationales as the moralistic one that in some
instances the retribution required by the written law is dis9 See H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 290-91: "The worst abuses of discretion
in enforcement occur in connection with those offenses that are just
barely taken seriously . . . . And it is here that the greatest danger
exists of using enforcement discretion in an abusive way: to pay off a
score, to provide a basis for extortion, to stigmatize an otherwise deviant
or unpopular figure." See also, Jackscn. The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 5 (1940):
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks
he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. . . . [Liaw enforcement becomes personal, and the real
crime becomes that of being unpopular with predominent or
governing group being attached to the wrong political views,
or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor
himself. (italics added).
Discretion as personal whim or prejudice may be part of the probblem, but only a small part. Neither is it very helpful to suggest as a more
appropriate practice the prosecution of "cases that need to be prosecuted," even where the focus, as above, is on discrimination in the narrow, personal, and political sense; the more pertinent problem, with
which this article deals, is the more subtle social and racial form of
discrimination.
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proportionate to the harm done,' or at the other extreme, such
essentially practical considerations as the difficulty of proof,
the existence of tangible non-criminal disposition alternatives,
or the need to conserve already overburdened criminal justice
resources appear to be operative. Finally, the analysis suggests
that "not too serious" and "not worth it" are at times independent rather than interdependent elements comprising the rationale behind diversion. It is a fact that some behavior which is
decidedly not low-danger is nonetheless deemed to be beyond
the scope of full intervention by the criminal process.
Before discussing specific offenses or offense categories
and the motivation for diversion in those instances, it must be
pointed out that linking of certain offense types to specific
rationales is to some extent an artifical process. The fact of the
matter is that diversionary decisions are often based not upon a
single rationale, but upon interdependent or even cumulative
sets of motives. The exercise thus often becomes a question of
singling out what appear to be the outstanding and more conspicuous motivations behind the decision to divert a specific
group of cases. At times, one motive will appear so obvious,
one circumstance of the offenses so compelling in terms calling
for a non-criminal disposition, that other motivations and circumstances naturally fall into the background. This is not to say
that other factors and rationales play no part at all, consciously
or subconsciously. In other instances, however, it is clear that
the decision to divert is based on a combination of circumstances surrounding the offense or the offender and that several
motivations are at play simultaneously, none of which are
separable or can be said to predominate.
A.

White Colbar Crimes
White collar offenses are "low-danger" offenses not involving violence and are typically committed by persons belonging
to the more advantaged sectors of society. 1 Included are business frauds, bad checks and the like. That the offense has
10 The argument, however, that discretion-diversion occurs only because
of the substantive impropriety of the law is too limited. Law enforcement officials divert for many other reasons and will continue to do so
even if laws become substantively more reasonable.
11H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 354:
As introduced by the sociclogist E. H. Sutherland, the term
refers to crimes that persons of respectability and high social
status commit in the course of their occupations. It is a sociological concept that cuts across legal categories, and it is admittedly
imprecise as a definition of categories of crime. The proper
function of the term is probably connotative rather than denotative. Nonetheless, it has some usefulness as a boundary-setting
term.
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become labeled in the criminal justice jargon to reflect the
typical offender is illustrative of the general fact that the characterization of an offense as non-serious or low-danger is heavily
permeated with an evaluation of the offender, as distinguished
from an evaluation of the act.1 2 The point is not only that the
act of perpetrating a business fraud or writing a bad check is
deemed to be relatively harmless. but that certain "sociological"
assumptions are made about the perpetrators as well. Many
criminal justice officials apparently adhere to the notion - and
they may have some empirical basis for this - that these middle
class offenders will not readily recidivate nor regress into patterns of more serious crime, and that the mere fact of official
detection serves as a sufficient deterrent against future misbehavior. 13 Even more compelling, the white collar offender is
typically a businessman, white, head of a family-in short,
someone with "status" and "worth" in the community. It is in
part this status which is seen to make criminalization disproportionate and prosecution inappropriate. The very frequent
response of the criminal justice system to these cases is therefore not to prosecute, but to simply compel the offender to
make restitution to the victim, or to extract a "promise to cease
and desist."' 4
The merits of this response are difficult to gauge. The following observations, however, may be deserving of further exploration. Though a measure of individualized justice based on
sound experience may be viewed as salutary, it would seem
that the exercise of discretion in the area of white collar
offenses is peculiarly open to misapplication. It is of course a
fact that discretion always entails this risk and that discretionary decisions are commonly based on assumptions of varying
validity. The problem, however, is that behavior is adjudged
innocuous not just by the evenhanded assumptions or misassumptions about the nature of the offense, but rather by unequal predictions or mispredictions based on the offender's social
12 For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see Sudnow, Normal
Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender
Office, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 255 (1964-65).
13 See F. MILLER, supra ncte 2, at 279:
Another factor present in many charging decisions is the economic and social standing of the suspect. In many such cases,
the administrative officials apparently believe they should be
more lenient because prosecution would be particularly harmful
to the suspect's reputation and the suspect's awareness cf and
concern for his own standing makes a recurrence of the offense
more unlikely. It is a regular practice in the Detroit's prosecutor's office not to charge well-to-do persons accused of offenses
such as exhibitionism and homosexual acts.
14 See id. at 272-73.
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status. There is a certain - perhaps perverse - sense of equality in predictions or assessments, be they reasonable or unreasonable, when these are derived from the nature of the offense.
In other words, there is an element of neutrality in the discretionary judgment that a particular type of offense is not worth
full prosecution, whether this judgment derives from the view
that the punishment prescribed by the law is too harsh, or that
the cases occur too frequently and would overload the system
at the expense of more "serious" matters. Examinations of the
specific circumstances surrounding the offense, including considerations bearing on the strength of the evidence, may also
play a legitimate part in the discretionary decision not to prosecute. These considerations are already more troublesome, however, in that they are "individual" and open to manipulation.
Consideration of the prior record of the offender, though perhaps a justifiable concern, is even more problematic. The problem is that consideration of "specific circumstances" readily
becomes a smokescreen for more arbitrary and subjective decisions, where a disproportionate focus is on the offender and on
his social status, where assessments cease to be neutral but
ter-.d to become expressions of favoritism towards a social group
(and prejudice to those outside of it) that is felt to have "something in common" with the decisionmakers, hence deemed to
be deserving of a "break," and for whom the confrontation
with the reality (brutality) of the criminal process would be
unsuitable.
Prior studies focusing on the handling of white collar
crimes1 5 have largely missed the systematic diversion which
occurs in this area of offenses. Such omission may in part be
attributable to the jurisdictional selection: the frequency and
regularity of diversion of white collar offenders may vary in
substance and, more particularly, in observability from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.1" Differentials may even be apparent within
15 See, e.g., H.

EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE

(published in May 1970 by the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice). But cf. J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND
SocIETY, ch. 7 "Embezzlement," at 289 (1952); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME (1961); and Robin, The Corporate and Judicial Disposition of Employee Thieves, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 685.
COLLAR CRIME

In one city, for example, the stated prosecutorial policy was "hard-nosed

is not our business, we're not a collection
prosecution -restitution
agency." By contrast, cfficials in two other cities made much of the fact
that they systematically diverted white collar offenses; restitution demand sheets (instruments of implementation) and statutory authority
were liberally shown and cited. Interestingly, the same rationale which
was used to support the stated policy of prosecution ("we're not a collection agency") was avowed to be the motivation for systematic diversion. More importantly, further discussion with the prcsecutor and with

other criminal justice officials in the non-diverting metropolitan area

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

a single jurisdiction since practice and stated policy shift with
changes in prosecutorial administrations." Our field investigation, however, indicates that observability may be the primary
factor accounting for apparent differentials in processing of
white collar crimes. Prosecutors who claim that they are "hardnosed" or "exercise little discretion" in this area in effect
operate quite similarly to those officials who are quite comfortable with-who in fact propagandize- their policy of diversion. Further studies in the area of white collar offenses should
take this fact into account."
Shoplifting
An analysis of the offense of shoplifting yields a series of
observations quite similar to those relating to white collar
offenses. There is no need to reiterate these. Separate mention
of the shoplifting situation is made here because it constitutes
a significant chunk of the types of non-serious cases where the
dispositional pattern is almost universally diversionary, and
because it provides a particularly notable illustration of the
notion that the offense can be adjudged non-serious when the
offender is presumed to be ripe for diversion by virtue of his
social position. Shoplifting, of course, can hardly be equated
with dangerous criminal behavior, but the offense is generally
regarded as highly repetitive behavior, furnishing, at least in
theory, a compelling basis for criminal processing.
The fact that many stores today post notification that
"shoplifters will be prosecuted" is implicit evidence of official
B.

revealed that, despite the "hard-nosed" talk, diversion of "appropriate"
cases was nonetheless a reality. In sum, dispositional practices were
roughly similar in all three cities.
17 Stated policy with regard to the handling of white collar crimes exhibits significant disparity, but the relationship between stated policy
and practice is uncertain. While practices vary in the sense that some

jurisdictions pursue a course of active implementation of the diversion
option and others play a role more akin to passive acquiescence to

private preferences, the evidence suggests that these variations do not

result in correspondingly different dispositional patterns in either volume or types of cases diverted. Whatever relationship exists between
stated policy, implementing practice, and dispositional consequence is

difficult to measure given the lack of data on diversionary decisions.
It should not be too readily assumed.

is A point of departure for subsequent investigation may be to focus on

those white collar cases which were routed through the regular criminal

process and not diverted. An examination of these more observable dispositions may well result in a finding that convicted white collar offendders are atypical in terms of social status of the label which describes
the class. Important as such a finding would be in its own right, it
would additionally demonstrate that crucial determinaticns are made at
a less observable level and provide clues as to when and where these
decisions are made, under what circumstances, and how frequently.
Also, such an examination would tend to test the relationship between
stated policy on the exercise of discretion and the concrete practice of
diversionary disposition, and clarify the meaning of dispositions recorded versus those which go unrecorded.
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practices whose aims are the converse of that."' Such notification announces perhaps the merchants' aspirations, but little
more than that. To be sure, some shoplifters are fully prosecuted,2 " but only those who quite clearly fall outside the group
which is normally accorded diversionary treatment.
When criminal justice officials talk about shoplifting, they
seem to be thinking exclusively of women offenders. The image
is one of slightly imbalanced, compulsive, older ladies who take
things not out of economic need, but from mysterious drives
attributed to menopausal

phenomena.2

1

Evidently, this image

contributes heavily to the notion that shoplifting is not worth
concern from the prosecutorial point of view, and that restitution and or fines are adequate and appropriate solutions.
The interesting aspect of the shoplifting situation is not
only that essentially adverse prejudice works in this situation
to the benefit of a class of offenders, but that factual circumstances and perceptions are virtually forced to conform to the
standard image. Apparently. the notion of "worth" in the community and the consequent protection accorded to persons of
that status figure even more strongly with respect to middle
class female offenders than they do in the white collar crime
situation. One almost wonders whether criminal justice officials
confronted with atypical shoplifters (e.g. a male) will venture
to transform the offense or the offender to fit the acceptable
dispositional pattern. This is, of course, an overstatement, but
the question may serve as a starting point for more intensive
inquiry into this area. A profitable focus might be to see how
prosecutorial discretion is exercised with respect -to atypical
shoplifters: how are the less tangible facts such as social or
racial status, occupational status, potential and prior criminal
record. and so forth, manipulated when "diagnostic" expectations and dispositional inclinations are upset by inescapable
physical facts?

'

See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3.

When shoplifters are caught, they are usually apprehended in
the act, which results in immediate recovery of the stolen goods.
Merchants generally are unwilling to prosecute, asserting that
they cannot afford the time away from the store to testify in
court or that they do not want to risk a loss of good will.
Thi. is only a partial explanation for the low volume of prosecutions.
The behavior cf enforcement officials is often determinative of the "unwillingess" to prosecute.
20

See, e.g.,

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-

MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT (especially footnotes).
AN ASSESSMENT 48-49 (1967)
A See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 179-80.
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Family Disputes

The very frequent fact of non-criminal handling of family
quarrels offers an appropriate setting for the recognition of
another rationale behind diversion: in an already overburdened
criminal justice system, a percentage of cases must be disposed
of with a mininal expenditure of resources. It is probably true
that this conservation argument lurks behind the entire spectrum of cases which are commonly diverted 2 2 but in the context of family disputes this rationale seems particularly compelling and conspicuous.
The observation that the diversion of intrafamily offenses
is firmly predicated on reasons of economies respecting the
utilization of criminal justice resources is not derived from the
statements of criminal justice officials. The conservation argument is rarely articulated probably because officials are reluctant to display the detachment (or cynicism) required for the
admission that it is operative. About the strongest response
obtained from officials queried on this area is that "discretion
must be exercised," otherwise there is "too much to handle."
That conservation of criminal justice resources is a predominant motivation behind the systematic diversion of family disputes is thus largely a matter of inference, negative inference
at that. The following factors point to its predominance: First
and generally, family quarrels are a high volume phenomenon,
constituting a major portion of police calls. This in itself implies that economies must be made and leads to the inference
that they are made. Secondly, diversion of a high proportion
of domestic incidents is an empirical fact, but the rationales
which support diversionary practices in other offense categories
do not apply. Family disputes are not nondangerous forms of
behavior, confined to socially preferred classes whose prior or
future behavior is or can be assumed to be non-repetitive or
non-regressive. To the contrary, as any police officer will
testify, domestic quarrels constitute high risk situations for
both the participants and enforcers. Intrafamily offenses cut
across social classes, and officials apparently perceive that fact.
Moreover, the offenses are commonly associated with prior and
future similar misbehavior. In fact, minimal intervention by
the criminal system is particularly notable in high-danger
areas of the cities, 23 a phenomenon which runs directly counter
22
23

Id. at 102-24.
In connection with this point on family disputes, it is appropriate to
refer to the problem of neighborhood assaultive behavior, since the

criminal justice system's response of minimal intervention in that area
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to the typical pattern that only offenders with social status
from worthy neighborhoods are selected for non-criminal handling. The notion that criminal processing of family disputes
is "not worth it" thus operates independently from assumptions
as to the non-seriousness of the offense or the positive characteristics of the offender. "Not worth it" in the context of
domestic offenses means primarily a reluctance to commit already over-taxed criminal justice resources to an unmanageable situation. The official response is usually temporary intervention at most. The decision to avoid criminal processing is
generally made at the earliest stage - by the police - and in
full recognition that this solution is inadequate, that it represents only "a temporary cooling-off." The typical attitude is:
you can't
"Tomorrow they'll probably be at it again -but
bring them all in."
There are other motivations at play in the diversion of domestic offenses. Already alluded to is the situation in parts of the
large inner-city areas - the ghettos in particular - where violence, including bloodshed, is an unfortunately common phenomenon. Law enforcement response in these areas is generally less
than adequate. 24 It is apparently the system's judgment that
more frequent and more incisive action is not worth the risk
and effort in neighborhoods where violent behavior is common
and thereby assumed to be condoned (and perhaps felt to be

24

of offenses reveals that some alternative motivations are at stake. "Neighhc.od assaults" are commonly understood to refer to acts of violence
committed among people who live in close physical and social proximity
to one another -specifically, in the city ghettos. Intrafamily offenses
can be said to be part of the neighborhood assault phenomenon. In our
field study, however, questions and responses were formulated along
the former category, hence the focus in the body of the article. The
point to be made is that, though the motivations of conservation and
difficulty of proof play a role in the handling (non-handling) of neighborhood assaults, additional reasons exist which reinforce these motivations and which render the policy of minimal involvement compelling
and operational. The need to conserve criminal justice resources operates along lines which are inverze to the usual diversionary process.
Diversion (if one can call it such) is the rule because violence is commonplace, not because it is isolated or aberrational; intervention is
avoided or minimized because it is dangerous to intervene, not because
the behavior is deemed innocuous. Some uneasy assumptions are involved: violence is tolerated which would be intolerable in more affluent communities. Disputants are left to their own devices "to work out
problems." But the evidence must be overwhelming, and overwhelmingly ignored, that the behavior tolerated by the system is not at all
tolerated in the disadvantaged communities, and that those left to work
out their own disputes are least capable of doing so.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 22, where the point is made
that this situation may be improving:
Not long ago there was a tendency to dismiss reports of all but
the most serious offenses in slum areas and segregated minority
group districts ....

[But c]rimes that were once unknown to the

police, or ignored when complaints were received, are now much
more likely to be reported and recorded as part of the regular
statistical procedure.
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"deserved"). A related factor motivating non-intervention is the
common experience (or assumption) that the adversaries to these
disputes are reluctant to take part in the prosecution of one another. This is an evidentiary problem, and it extends beyond the
city ghettos, providing a motivation for diversion of domestic disputes generally. The short of it is that the system will not be
burdened with cases where victims refuse to testify on the date
of trial. Finally, another motivation which is operative involves
the notion that a family should not be deprived of its bread2
winner and thus forced onto the welfare rolls.. ;,
These alternative motivations serve to reinforce the propriety
of diversionary dispositions already dictated by the need to conserve the system's resources. They do not undercut the basic
thesis that unmanageable quantity determines the quality (the
admitted inefficacy of minimal intervention) and frequency of
official response. They demonstrate the complex and sometimes
cumulative nature of motivations behind diversionary decision,
but fall short of being broadly applicable or self-sufficient rationales. Rather, they take the form of somewhat overworked excuses
often applied to less than appropriate situations in which it is
evident that decisions are actually based on economic considerations.
The police diversion practices range from no response, to
temporary "holding actions" until "things calm down,1126 to forcing the aggressor to sleep off his drunk in the park, and to providing transportation to a hospital for the injured. Sometimes
these are eminently appropriate actions. Moreover, the desire
to hold families together through nonintervention or through
paradoxically - temporary disruption may be both explainable and commendable, while the methods may at least be temporarily effective. A greater paradox, however, and one which
is in need of a better justification, is why action must always
stop that short, regardless of the circumstances that prompted
the dispute or those which might result in its persistence or
aggravation.
First Offense
First offenses, of course, include the categories of offenses
already discussed as commonly diverted. In addition to the rationales already discussed for diversion of white collar offenses,
shoplifting, or family quarrels, the decision to handle in a noncriminal manner may depend in part on the absence of a crimiD.

25
26

See F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 260-66.
Id. at 266-71.
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nal record, though a totally unblemished record is ordinarily
not required. Second or third offenders in the areas of business
frauds or shoplifting may still be given a "break." Persons involved in domestic misbehavior are likely to be diverted at a
stage too early for, or under circumstances which preclude,
even an inquiry into the question of prior record.
The categorization or recognition of an offense as a first
offense serves to assure diversion in classes of offenses where
there already exists a predisposition to divert. This re-emphasizes the point that the exercise of the discretion to handle in
non-criminal fashion is often based on a combination of circumstances and motivations. There is an element of the first
offense situation which, however, has a more independent character, constituting a more or less separate and distinct motivation accounting for the decision to handle in non-criminal
fashion.
First offenders are usually youthful offenders due to the
established fact that people who run afoul of the law at a later
age have often run afoul of the law before; stated conversely,
individuals without a criminal record developed in their more
youthful days are not so likely to develop one later in life.
In the folklore of criminal justice officials, as a result, the term
first offender is essentially equated with youthful offender,
and the standard enforcement response is influenced accordingly. First offenders (read youthful offenders) constitute a
preferred class who are given a "break" because to subject
them to the rigors of the criminal justice system at an impressionable age is felt to have adverse consequences. For first
offenders, criminalization is thought to result in a hardening
of anti-social tendencies, whereas for other offenders the theory
(or myth) is maintained that exposure to the criminal system
has a deterrent effect. A distinctive rationale is operative here:
prosecution of a first offense is deemed inappropriate not only
because the offense is deemed non-serious by virtue of the
nature of the act or assumptions about the offender, but because the consequences of full prosecution for the offender are
viewed differently. The selective adherence to or elimination
of the fictions which permeate criminal justice thinking, and
the substitution of new fictions, as exemplified in the handling
of first offenders, present an intriguing and intractable process.
Most probably it reflects an awareness, if a somewhat subconscious one, that more serious and systematic reevaluation
of the prevailing notions of deterrence, rehabilitation, retribu-
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tion, and morality in terms of their impact on the criminal
process at large, or diversion specifically, constitutes an alternative which crosses the boundary of political and social feasibility (if not personal imagination).
The decision to handle first offenses in non-criminal fashion
is also influenced by the existence of what are thought to be
clear and worthwhile non-criminal dispositional alternatives,
presumably more effective than such hopeful non-criminal sanctions as enforced restitution, official detection and so forth, the
inefficacy of which is often conceded by criminal justice officials themselves. For many young first offenders a very real
and at least temporarily effective dispositional alternative is the
military service. Criminal justice officials have an inordinate but for short-term purposes, perhaps a justifiable -faith in the
correctional value of military service. They will go to great
length to utilize this alternative. One prosecutor stated that he
would "wipe everything off the record" just to get the offender
in the Army, thus providing the pre-condition as well as the
incentive for the offender to "choose" this alternative. This
more extreme version of the non-criminal response again reveals
that circumstances can be made to fit the preconceived category
which would render the diversionary response indisputably appropriate. That is to say, the first offense category is quite an
elastic one, including offenders who are technically not first
offenders. The designation of an offense as a first offense is
often little more than a function of prosecutorial interpretation,
since in many instances something can be found in the record
of a non-youthful offender which disqualifies him from first
offender treatment, while for the youthful offender there is
usually something that can conveniently be ignored. This phenomenon may be both an outgrowth of, and an explanation for,
the equation made between first offenders and youthful offenders; in that sense, the first offender situation is analogous to
other diversion categories and reminiscent of the point made
semi-facetiously earlier that a shoplifter is a menopausal old
lady or else is not a shoplifter.
Another typical non-criminal response to first offenses is
the "deferred sentence. '27 The peculiarity of this diversionary
27

As distinguished from "deferred prosecution," which is also a common
diversionary practice, deferred sentence implies a hearing and convict'on prior to the diversionary determination. In practice, however,

the concepts are less distinct. In the cities visited during the course of
the field work, most officials appeared to be talking
sentence, though at times the term deferred prosecution
changeably with deferred sentence, and the concepts
Even judges within a single jurisdiction labeled this

about deferred
was used interwere confused.
exercise of dis-
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disposition is that it is at least technically a function of judicial,
rather than prosecutorial or police, discretion and occurs at a
late stage of the criminal process. The fact that relatively significant criminal justice resources have been expended prior to
the decision to divert would emphasize the fact that, as compared to other offense categories discussed, the conservation
argument plays a smaller part in the handling of the first
(youthful) offenders class of cases.
The judicial decision to defer the sentence of a first offender
has been said to amount to a disposition in the nature of
"informal probation." The judge hears the evidence surrounding
the act and the background of the offender, upon which he
predicates the decision to delay judgment for a period of 6
months or a year. During this time the offender has a chance
to prove himself worthy of the special consideration accorded
to him. Good behavior during this period results in the sentence
being dropped. Since there is practically no supervision over
the offender during the time of his conditional status, it has
been argued that the deferred sentence is an inadequate dispositional alternative, in effect a minimal response like most
other diversionary dispositions. This argument, however, ignores
the fact that the deferred sentence poses a threat to the offender
which in appearances - if not in actuality - is quite immediate,
serious and predictable. The consequence of misbehavior, including minor infractions, during the conditional period is imposition of the original sentence with no further consideration
given.
IV.

FORMALIZING DIVERSIONARY PRACTICES

Having sketched the character of these several categories
of offenses, the reasons behind diversion in each category, and
the specific non-criminal dispositions commonly applied to each,
the discussion which follows focuses on attempts, and their impact, to formalize these processes. The diversionary practices
treated in this article are, as stated earlier, characteristically
lacking in formality, low in observability, and devoid of such
institutional elements as specialization of personnel and thorough
data gathering and reporting. If one of the aims of formalization
is to remedy this situation, it has not been achieved. Legislative
cretion variously, and the procedural technicalities differed at some
points. One judge said that he in essence convicted before deferring
the ultimate judgment; another judge claimed there was no conviction.
Regardless of labels applied, the process is characterized by perfunctory
hearings on the merits (the evidence) held prior to the decision to
divert. The distinctions center on where or in what manner of formality
the decisions and findings which will subsequently be "re-entered" or
-'expunged," depending on the offender's interim behavior, are recorded.
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or administrative schemes designed to formalize one or several
of the diversionary practices described exist today in many of
our larger cities, but the experiences have generally been limited,
tools of implementation have been wanting, and little reliable
data on impact has been collected. As a consequence, responses
in the course of the field survey were largely confined to
vague descriptions by criminal justice officials who were neither
very knowledgeable nor enthusiastic about the formal programs.
Alternatively, enthusiastic program directors would hand out
what were in effect self-serving and inflated reports indicating
the unmitigated successes of their diversion schemes. Despite
these limitations, sufficient impressionistic data was obtained
to justify an attempt in this article to describe and speculate
about the operations, goals, and rationales of existing and proposed formalized diversion programs.
The formalization of diversion poses serious dilemmas. The
enactment into law of discretionary diversion practices aims to
impart a measure of uniformity, predictability, and evenhandedness to an area of the criminal process where there is perceived to be an excess of unchecked discretion and unequal
application.2 8 Formalization also seeks to legitimize and extend
more widely what are viewed as extra-legal and sporadic practices. The problem, however, is whether these goals can be
achieved, or even whether they should be. The questions to be
posed are whether the ends of equality of application, standardization, legitimation, and extension can be accomplished without sacrificing the ends of diversion itself, and whether criminal
justice officials can be persuaded that formality is workable
and desirable: in short, whether the elimination (or better, the
reduction) of discretion which accompanies formalization is not
accompanied by both results and means which are shortsighted
and counter-productive. The answers to these questions will be
explored by again turning to the specific offense categories
and legislative or administrative schemes which have sought to
codify or programmatize the non-criminal processing commonly
reserved for these offenses.
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See, e.g.,

K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 225 (1969): "Prosecutors
should be required to make and to announce rules that will guide their
choices, stating . . . what will and what will not be prosecuted, and they

should be required otherwise to structure their discretion." The quote
above reveals an oversimplification of the problem. Can we expect
prosecutcrs and police to announce as rules diversionary practices motivated by complex, sometimes prejudicial, and often subconscious perceptions?
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Statutory Grace Periods and White Collar Crimes
Formalization of diversionary responses to white collar of29
Prosecufenses has focused primarily on the bad check'area.
tion of bad check offenses in most of the several large cities
visited during our field work is technically controlled by state
statutes which provide that the offender shall have 5 or 10 days
in which to atone for his offense-i.e. make restitution to the
payee. ° The response of criminal justice officials to these
statutes is variable, which serves to point up various weaknesses of attempts to formalize diversionary decisions. One feature of the statutes is that they commonly frame the restitution
concept in terms of intent- failure to make restitution after
feature
notification constitutes proof of intent to defraud -a
which serves to obscure the diversionary purpose of the provisions, and thereby facilitates a blunting of the diversionary
mandate on the operational level.
One observed response was to ignore the statutory mandate. The statute typically eliminates discretion by making the
grace period applicable to all writers of bad checks. Implementation of the provision contemplates the circulation of "restitution demand forms" to potential victims (i.e., merchants) and
the availability of such forms to actual victims who have
brought complaints. Ignoring the statute was accomplished by
simply not making such forms available and not publicizing the
possibility of this form of redress. The decision to divert or not
thus remained entirely within the discretion of the criminal
justice officials, who stated that they continued to prosecute
"only criminals." Restitution was considered by these officials
as morally and practically irrelevant. The decision to handle a
bad check offense in non-criminal fashion rested, as it had prior
to the statute, on whether the offender was typical of the class
of white collar offenders: the decisions to prosecute would
ensue if the offender of offense was atypical, involving a repeater, one with a record of other criminal behavior, or an
amount of money which was exceptionally large. Criminal
justice officials summed up their position as follows: "If it's
a crime, it's a crime- the statute only complicates the question
of when you can say that the crime has been committed." In
their view, the relationship drawn by the statute between restitution and intent was too tenuous, and the equation between
intent and criminality (subject to prosecution) unacceptable.
A.
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See F.

30

E.g.,

MILLER,

supra note 2, at 272-73.
§ 609.535 (1963)

MINN. STAT. ANN.

and "Comments" thereto.
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Restitution, they felt, did not necessarily disprove intent, nor
did it turn a "criminal" into a harmless offender. Failure to
make restitution did not automatically prove intent, let alone
indicate criminality and the impropriety of diversion. The
essence of their response was that dispositional decisions were
too complex to be left to hard and fast statutory rules which
ignored both the subtle and obvious realities of law enforcement experience and eliminated the practical tool-discretion
-for dealing with these realities. It may be an obvious and
trivial point to assert that formalization attempts do not work
when they are ignored. What may not be so trivial, however, is
the fact that the formalization was ignored because officials
felt that it could not work.
The response of at least partial compliance with the statute
in another jurisdiction is indicative of the problems created by
formalization and perhaps envisioned by the non-complying
officials. The situation in another of the cities visited involved
a typical but "brand new" restitution statute which provided
that the writer of a bad check would be given 10 days to satisfy
the complainant and thus avoid prosecution. The newness of
the statute might have accounted for the fact that at least
partial compliance prevailed: criminal justice officials were
only beginning to perceive the effects of the statute and such
adjustments as might be made had not yet been made. Officials
complained that their discretionary power, which they believed
they had exercised on the basis of valid experience and intuition, had been subverted. The statute's universal applicability
meant that bad check cases involving small amounts which
were formerly ignored might now necessitate official action,
despite the fact that the nature of the offense and attendant
suppositions about the offender made informal resolution more
appropriate. Alternatively, habitual or significant bad check
offenses were now precluded from prosecution if the offender
complied with the restitution demand. The quantitative impact
of the statute was stated to be a "slight increase" in the number
of formal charges filed. More important, however, were the
non-quantifiable effects; what the figures did not reflect was
that the application of the statute produced offsetting improprieties of result; nor did the figures measure the level of frustration of officials responsible for the enforcement of the statute.
In sum, the legislation which sought to codify and regularize
existing diversionary practices, instead changed practices, which
in turn exerted pressure upon officials to revert to their informal
approach by ignoring the statute or by way of a search for and
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application of newly contrived criteria upon which diversionary decisions would be based.
The tension between formalized and discretionary diversion
is extreme in this area of the law. The empirical evidence suggests that formalization will either be ineffectual or detrimental
to rational processing. It would appear that statutes in this
area should be limited to the role of legitimation and avoid
circumscription of informal practices; but a statute which only
legitimizes is virtually a non-statute.
B.

Restitution, Fines, and Shoplifting

Formalization attempts in the area of shoplifting were met
with a form of adjustment by criminal justice officials which
did not materialize in the bad check area. The reaction to the
shoplifting statutes was to ease the impact of formalization by
restructuring the grounds upon which informal discretion could
be exercised and old inclinations could be pursued. As in the
bad check area, therefore, legislative efforts to make uniform
and predictable the diversionary response seem to be failing.
The underlying reasons are similiar as well: criminal justice
officials believe that the dispositional pattern of diversion
established by informal discretion is sufficiently evenhanded
and predictable, while maintaining the advantage of regular
processing of cases which because of special circumstances surrounding the offense or the offender fail to qualify for noncriminal handling. Formalization, they feel, takes away the
option to make appropriate exceptions to the common response,
or worse, it turns exceptions into rules.
Discussions of shoplifting statutes and their impact, 3' while
acknowledging that the incidence of prosecution of shoplifters
has been negligible, have failed to relate this fact to the diversionary practices of law enforcement officials. Instead, the low
volume of prosecutions has been attributed to the merchants'
unwillingness to take the time and expense to prosecute, 32 and
to their fear of countersuit for unwarranted apprehension and
prosecution by suspected shoplifters. Analysis of the statutes
and proposals for reform have thus focused on factors dealing
with the procedural facilitation and the rights of merchants
to be free from liability in the detection and pursuit of shoplifting offenses. While such an emphasis is not entirely misplaced, it does ignore the significant role played by diversion.
' See,

e.g., Note, The Merchant, the Shoplifter and the Law, 55

REV. 825 (1971).

32

See note 19, supra.
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Diversionary practices with regard to shoplifting have been
formalized and circumscribed in the following manner: Offenses
involving goods of small value (the cut-off point varying between $20 and $100) are implicitly or explicitly categorized as
misdemeanors by the statutes; goods valued over the specifically
stated dollar amounts are felonies.3 3 Such categorization greatly
reduces, if not eliminates, discretion in that the exercise of discretion often turns on the ability to label an offense according
to the disposition desired. Law enforcement officials put it this
way: "Discretion applies mainly to misdemeanors, we have very
little of it in felonies." What they mean, in the context of
shoplifting, is that when the statute takes away the discretion
to label the degree of the offense, they are less free to exercise,
if not totally inhibited from exercising, dispositional discretion.
In concrete terms it means that the diversionary response such as restitution and fine or the handling as a municipal
violation -is no longer an open option when an "irrelevancy"
such as a statutorily defined sum being exceeded is present.
The hard facts of the offense rather than the manipulable
nature of the offender have become the focus of decisionmaking.
The statutes approximate the informal pattern which prevailed
before their enactment, but by the shift in focus have the potential effect of rigidifying and transforming the informal pattern
which prevailed previously.
Resistance on the part of criminal justice officials to this
formalization takes the shape of differentially interpreting the
dollar amount of the goods in question. In one of the jurisdictions studied, where the statutory division between misdemeanor and felony was placed at $20, the following process
occurred: if a "typical" shoplifter - one who merits diversion
because she meets the preconceptions of officials regarding such
offenders -took something worth $40 from a shop, the officials
would argue that the wholesale value (say only $19) was the
relevant value, and hence that restitution and/or fine were the
appropriate responses. Conversely, less favored offenders were
sometimes prosecuted for goods priced $21 in the store.
To evaluate formalization attempts against the background
of the reactions to them is problematic. Beyond question, the
desire to eliminate discrimination or favoritism is laudable in
the abstract. But the costs may be too great. The disadvantages
of eliminating properly exercised discretion which accompanies
:3 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.20 (Supp. 1970). See also Note, supra note
31, at 835 n. 63 for a listing of shoplifting statutes.
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formalization may outweigh the prevention of improperly exercised discretion. Unbalancing the criminal system's dispositional
patterns and motivations produces undesirable consequences.
At its worst, it could result in disruption and chaos through the
overloading of the system's resources. Or it could lead to blatantly inappropriate dispositions.: Ultimately, however, it is
unlikely that these consequences would be permanent because
the tendency of the system is towards internal accommodation
and adjustment. Consequently. the result will probably be in
the nature of a subversion of statutory mandates through contrived interpretations which shift the surface features of decisionmaking, but in essence maintain the discretion and dispositional pattern as before. Alternatively, the response will be
to wholly ignore the statutes. One might argue that compliance
with the statutes should be forced upon the criminal justice
officials who are professionally and legally bound to operate
within their context. But it is more difficult to argue that this
can be done.
Peace Bonds and Family Disputes
The discretionary handling of family quarrels is an area
where legislatures have on the whole not intervened. Perhaps
this restraint is attributable to the recognition that the power
to divert is exercised largely on the police level and, hence, is
not to be tampered with, absent knowledge of the range of
situations and motivations which influence police practices.
Legislative intervention is more commonly directed towards
later, more conspicious stages of the criminal process. Legislators, rightly or wrongly, appear to feel that the field of prosecutorial or judicial powers is more within their range of understanding or expertise, whereas police practices remain a sacrosanct mystery, not to be defiled by the meddlings of the ignorant. Perhaps legislators are also aware of the exceptional
delicacy of domestic disputes, their potential or actual seriousness, and the ambivalence of the participants, and have therefore refrained from the imposition of absolutes in this area.
C.

About the only "diversionary" legislation pertaining to
domestic offenses derives from the practice of issuing peace
bonds to intrafamily disputants. In most cities the peace bond
::4
'Inappropriate" refers here to the view (shared by many criminal jus-

tice officialS as well as commentators) that the law is a blunt instrument,
the full force or harshness of which should be used sparingly. The criminal law is perceived to be designed to deal only with "hard cases," to be
applied tnot equally but in essence unequallyi.e., with discretion to
divert cr mitigate if the circumstances surrounding the offense or the
offender so warrant, or if pressures on the system compel it.
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is today regarded as an ineffective deterrant to future misbehavior and has fallen into disuse..3 5 Similarly, the statutes
which speak to this practice have ceased to be of practical
relevance. The peace bond was a peculiar method for handling
family quarrels in non-criminal fashion. It was also of dubious
legality. The bond, which was usually not even paid by the
offender, served ostensibly as an alternative to criminal processing, imposing a threat that liberty or money would be summarily forfeited in case of a recurrence of misbehavior. That
this dubious practice was ever legislatively sanctioned reveals,
more than anything else, that police work is regarded as beyond interference.3
Discretion in the domestic dispute area
thus remains unchecked. This may well be sound in an area of
such complexity and unpredictability, where one the primary
motivations for diversion is the conservation of criminal justice
resources-a motivation which does not lend itself easily to
legislative expression without embarrassment.
Assuming formalization be deemed desirable in this area,
on the other hand, the thrust of it should be directed toward
facilitating and improving the selection process. That is, rather
than rigorously defining those cases which may or may not be
diverted, formalization attempts might best be framed in terms
of providing for special departmental units on both police and
prosecutorial levels trained to handle family crisis situations."7
The aim would be to place qualified and numerically adequate
personnel in charge where the need for intervention is greatest,
as determined by soundly exercised discretion.
D.

Deferred Sentences, Court Employment Programs,
and First Offenses
Those who have sought to formalize diversion in the first
offense category adopt the equation made by criminal justice
officials between first offenders and youthful offenders: the
formalization proponents use these designations interchangeably
when speaking of their programs or proposals. The equation
provides the justification for and explains the motivation behind
formalized diversion in this area.
35
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See F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 266-71.
For a different view of peace bond procedures, see AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS Ch. 3, "Charging"
(D. McIntyre ed. 1967).

37 A big step in that direction is the New York City Police Department's

"Family Crisis Intervention Unit" (FCIU). For a description and evaluation of the FCIU, see M. BARD, TRAINING POLICE AS SPECIALISTS IN FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTIONS (Final Report to LEAA, G.P.O. 70-1 (1970);
Parnas, The Response of Some Relevant Community Resources to IntraFamily Violence, 44 IND. L.J. 159 (1969).
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The armed services disposition has not been subjected to
the process of formalization and it remains within the discretion of criminal justice officials to apply this bi;and of diversion
to "appropriate" individuals. Deferred sentences, however, have
become formalized processes in several cities, and proposals or
38
pressures to formalize exist in several other urban centers.
Deferred sentences as a formal process are associated in
several cities with administratively established "court employment programs."'3" Of interest is the fact that these programs
appear to provide the impetus and motivation for the judicial
decision to defer sentence,- rather than the other way around.
This is the case despite the fact that formalization schemes
generally are conceived as responses to informal situations and
that court-employment programs are designed specifically to
provide follow-up services subsequent to the decision to defer.
The formalization or programmatization of the practice to defer
sentence does not involve the elimination or structuring of discretion which characterizes the other formalizing attempts discussed. Judicial discretion remains essentially untouched, and
it is only the conspicious availability of follow-up services
which may serve to change the informal pattern of whom, or
how many, shall be selected. It is on this matter of selection
that attention will be focused here.
Court employment programs provide services in the nature
of job-training, education, job-seeking, and so forth, during the
informal probationary period which ensues upon deferral of
sentence. The services are thus designed to help the offender
prove that he merits having the sentence ultimately dismissed.
38 A judge in one city where the deferred sentence was still a matter of

informal discretion exercised exclusively by that particular judge stated
that he was lobbying to "have this practice written into the law." What
made his efforts peculiarly noteworthy was that this judge on the whole
expressed strong opposition to attempts to formalize informal diversionary practices. His reason for expecting the deferred sentence matter
frcm his more general viewpoint appeared to derive from the fact that he
was unable to persuade his judicial colleagues to adopt this practice as
an informal scheme, and thus forced to resort to the admittedly risky
formalization approach so as to extend what he felt was a desirable dispositional option.
The function of the formalization proposed by the judge was clearly
one of publication and legitimation of existing informal practices. The
problem is whether written legislation can be so limited. Perhaps the
absence of formal authority to divert is especially inhibiting on the
judicial level. If so, legislation which seeks to legitimize may be worth
the risks inherent in formalization. It would appear, however, that discretion on the police and prosecutorial level is exercised with less inhibition. A recognition of this fact should have a bearing on whether,
to what ends, and cn what level, informal diversionary practices should
be formalized.
.Some of the major U.S. cities having such programs are New York,
Washington, D.C., Boston, Cleveland, and Minneapolis.
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They also turn his informal conditional status into - at least
theoretically- a more formal, more closely supervised arrangement, thus providing a better basis for the eventual (second)
exercise of judicial discretion of whether the sentence against
the offender shall be enforced or avoided.
Court employment programs have been criticized as doing
formally and at great expense the same that used to be done
informally at no expense. This assessment may be somewhat
overly cynical. The services provided are often real and
worthwhile, and less likely to be accorded to an offender absent
the formal program. It must be deemed common knowledge
by now that existing service agencies, because of lack of coordination and contact with the criminal system, often fail to
reach those they are designed to service-i.e., individuals
diverted or released from the criminal system. This is a strong
argument in favor of the court employment programs.
The negative assessment of court employment programs
may be seen, more appropriately, as a reaction to inflated
claims of success by the programs themselves. "Failure rates"
in the programs tend to be minimized by the self-serving
nature of the selection which extracts only those who are most
likely to succeed and who may be least in need of the services
offered. Moreover, it is conceivable that judges exhibit a partiality to participants in the program and are influenced to
decide upon dismissal of sentence largely on the mere fact of
participation. These would be serious shortcomings of the court
employment programs. It is suggested here that if such programs are to be adopted, that special efforts be made to include
those offenders who by virtue of family, social or racial background are not so likely to succeed. It would be better to maintain the incompleteness of the informal deferred sentence system than to waste scarce resources in order to divert a few
favored first offenders into programs which concentrate exces4
sively on achieving high success rates. 1'
CONCLUSION

Non-criminal handling of less-serious criminal offenses is a
fact - an inescapable, if not very observable, fact, of the operation of the criminal justice process in both urban and rural
40

For a description and evaluation of a deferred sentencing system, see
S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 446-51 (1963) on New
York's Youthful Offender Procedure. Rubin feels that the New York
experience was "successful" and deplores what he describes as the
politically motivated repeal of the procedure. "Politically," here is used
in contradistinction to a repeal on the merits.

DIVERSION

areas. The frequency and efficacy of this type of response is
not readily measurable, in part because it is mostly an informal
response, as well as a conceptually complex one. In most instances, quantifications are not made, records are not kept, and
categorizations are avoided. The decision to divert, moreover,
depends upon subtle and not-so-subtle pressures upon criminal
justice philosophies and resources; the motivations behind discretionary decisions accordingly vary in kind and in perceptibility; and rare is the criminal justice official who intellectually
recognizes and ably articulates the diversion he practices. Even
rough statements as to frequency and efficacy are difficult to
come by. Finally, the formalization of diversion is selective and
sporadic. Such attempts are often nonconducive to general inferences because newly established, misleading because disruptive of earlier motivational and dispositional patterns, or inconsequential because ignored. While these formalization attempts
provide an indirect indication of the merits of at least a measure of informality and discretion, they fail to yield more than
the indefinite data which emerge from the informal practices.
A comprehensive evaluation of the practice of non-criminal
disposition of criminal cases would constitute a monumental,
if not impossible, task. The lack of quantification and articulation is only a small part of the problem. An evaluative statement would have to deal with a weighing of complex, interrelated, often subjective, values; it would have to confront serious methodological problems of access and time in the effort to
gauge the effects of diversion on those diverted; it would seek
to measure what is essentially immeasurable in an objective
sense; it would inevitably limit itself to isolated assertions
detached from a larger and inseparable context. This is not to
say that the concept of diversion is not worthy of further
study, but only that the subject be approached with a sense of
caution and modesty. What is now needed in the area of diversion are studies with more specific and intensive foci on particular issues and problems. "Diversion" is a complex and
varied topic: inquiries in the nature of all-inclusive fishing
expeditions are unmanageable and unfruitful for other than
exploratory purposes, and the need for exploratory information
is diminishing. One of the values of the survey upon which
this article is based is the recognition of these facts. The article
itself is a small impressionistic step, a description of selected
diversionary practices and their rationales coupled with some
thoughts on the propriety of these practices and some caveats
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regarding the attempts to formalize them. Its purpose is to lend
a measure of understanding to, and provoke interest in, this
area of criminal justice, and by its suggestions and omissions
41
prompt further inquiry.
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Presently, the American Bar Foundation, as a second phase of its project
cn Non-criminal Dispositions of Criminal Cases, is making an intensive
study of court, prosecution, and police records in several cities so as to
shed light - both quantitative and qualitative - on some of the issues.

